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Abstract 
 
Rising costs of disability insurance (DI) programs are putting increased strain on central 
government budgets, yet little is known about how well countries target those in the poorest 
health. In this paper, we use the SHARE and HRS surveys to measure the average health of 
people aged 50-64 receiving DI, and the effectiveness of the DI safety net in covering those in 
poor health. The U.S. and Denmark appear successful at targeting benefits, with France and 
Belgium less so. These measures can also be used over time to evaluate country-level policy 
changes. 
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1.  Introduction 
 There are large variations across countries in the fraction of the population age 50-64 
receiving disability insurance (DI) payments, ranging from 3.0 percent in France and Italy to 
11.1 percent in the United States and 18.4 percent in Sweden.1  Most countries are concerned 
about disability insurance enrollment, and the resulting pressure on public sector budgets in 
Europe and the United States (European Commission, 2006; OECD, 2003, 2010; McVicar, 2008; 
Leibman, 2015).   
  Previous literature suggests that institutional features of disability programs reflecting 
ease of being accepted and generosity of benefits are important determinants of the overall size 
of a country’s DI program (Börsch-Supan, 2006, 2010, 2011; Milligan and Wise, 2012).  Yet 
there is little or no information about the characteristics of disability insurance enrollees across 
countries. Do programs with high enrollment rates accept more “gray-area” applicants who are in 
better health or who have better job opportunities than average?  Or do smaller-than-average 
disability insurance programs fail to cover those who are truly ill?  When countries scale back on 
disability programs, do the declines in enrollment occur among healthier or less healthy 
individuals?  
One approach to characterizing the health of DI enrollees is to estimate the labor supply 
effects of those rejected from DI (e.g., Bound, 1984; Maestes et al., 2013), but these estimates 
reflect the labor market opportunities of the incremental DI enrollee, and are difficult to compare 
across countries with different labor markets.  Milligan and Wise (2012) found little association 
                                                  
1 These estimates are from SHARE wave 5 (collected in 2013) and HRS wave 11 (collected in 2012 and 
2013), described below, in Table A.2. 
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across countries between mortality rates and self-reported health of DI enrollees across countries, 
but mortality captures only the sickest among the disabled, and does not capture broader 
measures of disability among those who survive.  A third approach, pioneered by the OECD 
(2003, 2010), characterizes DI programs across countries along a range of dimensions such as 
the severity of disability needed to qualify, the duration and size of the compensation, and types 
of vocational and employment support, summarized by numerical scores giving equal weight to 
each dimension.  Yet it is difficult to know how well official government regulations translate 
into actual practice in the DI programs on a day-to-day basis, nor what is the optimal weighting 
scheme of these disparate measures.   
In this paper, we introduce a new approach to quantitatively assess the health of disability 
enrollees. We base estimates on micro-level data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
and the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) for a set of 10 European 
countries and the United States for respondents between ages 50-64 from 2004-12.   Our 
approach is based on an earlier literature on the targeting of income assistance programs to those 
most in need (e.g., Besley and Kanbur, 1993; Brady and Burrowa, 2012).  In a similar way, we 
seek to measure how well a country’s disability program targets those in the poorest health.  
There are a number of ways to characterize disability (Mitra, 2005).  We exploit the 
richness of health-related information available in both SHARE and HRS to construct three 
different health indices following the principal components methodology used by Poterba, Venti 
and Wise (2010, 2011, 2013).  To adjust for differences across countries in how individuals 
respond to survey questions about health (e.g., Kapteyn, Smith and van Soest, 2009, van Soest et 
al., 2011), we assign a health percentile to each household within each country.2  
                                                  
2 By creating percentiles specific to each country, we avoid potential biases in how people in different 
countries respond to questions about their health, but at the same time, we forego making comparisons of 
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Our first index is based on the variant of Poterba, Venti and Wise (2013), (PVW) 
expanded to include the SHARE data and designed to capture an overall measure of health and 
capacity for work. The second index of health uses the same principal component 
methodological approach of PVW, but is based on capturing functional ability, as in Mont and 
Loeb (2010); we refer to this as ML. Third, we use a similar principal component approach to 
create a mental health index/depression (MHD) index, to capture the severe impact of depression 
on employment even when the individual is healthy along other dimensions (OECD, 2012). 
Finally, we also consider a fourth hybrid summary measure that is the minimum of these three 
indices, suitably rescaled in percentile terms.      
We first create semi-parametric representations of how country-specific DI recipiency 
varies across the entire distribution of health, and in addition consider several summary statistics. 
The first is the average (percentile) health status among those receiving disability insurance.  
Average health percentiles will tend (almost mechanically) to be higher in countries with larger 
DI programs, but conditional on the size of the program, countries more effective in targeting 
will experience lower average percentile health measures for those on disability insurance.  The 
second summary statistic captures the ability of the DI program to cover people in the bottom 
decile of the health distribution.  
The third measure captures the possibility that countries use their disability programs to 
insure against poor labor market outcomes or jobs involving manual labor prior to retirement. 
That is, if countries use their DI programs in part to cover not just those who are disabled, but 
those who are less severely disabled but with poor labor market skills, then we would want to 
capture those objectives in our models.  We therefore consider a model that captures the extent to 
                                                  
health status across countries. We therefore have less to say about the absolute size of the DI program, but 
more about how well country-level DI programs of similar relative sizes target their recipients.  
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which country-specific disability programs “sort” on the basis of a combined index that captures 
both health and market skills (as measured by educational attainment).  
We consider the pooled survey data from the 2004-2012 SHARE and HRS waves, and 
find large differences across countries in the health status of people receiving DI benefits. 
Consider for example two countries with similar sized DI programs, the U.S. (9.7 percent of the 
50-64 population during 2004-12) and Belgium (9.2 percent in same period).  Using the PVW 
index, we find that the average percentile of health for DI enrollees in the US is 15.0 percent; for 
Belgium 25.0 percent, suggesting that the US DI system is more effective in targeting those who 
are in poor health.3 Our alternative measures of health yield similar results, with particular 
promise for the functionality index (ML) based on Mont and Loeb (2010).    
The fraction of people in the bottom decile of the health distribution who are covered by 
DI also differs across countries, ranging from France (just 11.9 percent), to the U.S. (50.7 
percent), Denmark (52.1 percent), and Sweden (62.5 percent). These differences are attenuated 
but persist when we include the receipt of early retirement programs that could substitute for DI 
insurance (e.g., Borghans et al., 2014).  Furthermore, it does not appear that low educational 
attainment (relative to tertiary education) has any significant impact on the likelihood of DI 
enrollment, conditional on health – except in Denmark.  This result is consistent with Denmark’s 
recognition as a country with “best practice” DI programs (according to OECD, 2009) that help 
to keep disabled people with better employment opportunities in the labor force.  
Finally, we can track how well these micro-based measures capture the impact of DI 
reforms reducing DI enrollment, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, or the impact of growth, 
such as the US and Belgium. For example, de Jong et al. (2013) and Koning and Lindeboom 
                                                  
3 We also consider an alternative interpretation below – that the lengthy process of application and appeal 
in the U.S. may adversely affect health.   
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(2015) have shown that more intensive screening of disability applicants in the Netherlands led 
to improved targeting of recipients.  We also find a decline in enrollment rates, a modest 
improvement in targeting, but with the DI coverage of those in the poorest health slipping from 
52.4 percent in 2004 to 42.3 percent in 2012.4  The reverse pattern is found in the U.S., where 
disability rates have increased from 8.3 percent to 11.3 percent during this period, and the safety 
net has improved. As more countries embark on DI reforms, these quantitative measures can be 
used to monitor country-level success or failure in targeting those in poor health.  
 
2.  Model and Estimation 
 
 The general theory of targeting is straightforward; A given level of social spending 
should be targeted to those in greatest need.  For example, in the case of poverty alleviation, 
targeting is diluted when higher-income households receive financial transfers, or when truly 
poor households fail to receive these transfers (Brown et al., 2016).  The problems arise when the 
objective of the transfer program, to alleviate poverty, leads to adverse incentives that lead to 
greater revenue costs and inadequate provision of benefits, for example when recipients change 
their behavior in order to qualify for the transfer or a larger cash payment from the program 
(Besley and Kanbur, 1993). These issues of incentive compatibility arise as well in disability 
insurance programs, which are further complicated by the inability to even measure health, or 
functional capabilities in the sense of Amartya Sen (Sen, 1995; Mitra, 2005; Mont, 2007).  Thus 
countries may optimally (or sub-optimally) adopt a variety of different approaches for 
transferring resources to the disabled.  Aside from qualitative information on government 
                                                  
4 The corresponding decline for any pension was from 65.4 percent in 2004 to 57.7 percent in 2012.  
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policies (OECD, 2003, 2010), there is little quantitative evidence across countries on 
characteristics of individuals who qualify (or who do not qualify) for disability insurance.  
To fill this gap, we consider a general model of disability application (and acceptance), 
and its empirical implementation.  The objective of disability insurance is to provide financial 
support for those with mental or physical disabilities leading to poor market opportunities and 
the need for financial assistance.  We consider two versions of the model. In the simplest 
version, we assume that the primary determinant of whether the individual receives disability 
insurance is health status.  Of course, health status is a complex multi-factorial concept, and we 
consider several approaches to measuring it below.   
DI receipt occurs through a two-step process.  First, the individual chooses to apply for 
DI insurance, and then the application is reviewed (and perhaps initially rejected) by the DI 
agency.  Thus receipt of benefits is the product of the binary variable of whether one applies, and 
whether the application is approved.  Our reduced form model of this two-step process is:5  
 (1)       
otherwiseY
YifY
uHhXY
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where ∗ is a linear index for individual i and country j which, if positive, implies that the 
application (or receipt) Yij = 1 occurs, and where Yij is zero otherwise, and  = (). The 
(joint) decision of whether to apply, and whether the applicant is accepted, is also dependent on 
factors such as age, sex, and marital status; these are measured by the vector Xij. While we use 
                                                  
5 In the logistics model, it can be shown that the reduced form coefficients reflected weighted averages of 
the parameters related to application, and the parameters that determine the likelihood of acceptance 
given the application takes place. 
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these variables in the regression analysis, our primary focus is on national rates of disability or 
functionality within our age group of 50-64.6    
The likelihood that ∗ is positive in turn depends on the health hij of the individual, and 
whether it exceeds the country-specific benchmark Hj.  (Note that better health corresponds to a 
higher h, which means that αj < 0.)   There are 3 key factors that determine the country level rate 
of people receiving DI.  The first is the distribution of health status hij. Because of concerns 
about differences across countries in how disability is perceived and reported (e.g., Kaptyen, 
Smith, and van Soest, 2009), we focus in this paper solely on the relative distribution of health 
within a country; thus hij will in practice be considered in country-specific percentile terms (as in 
Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 2013, and Meijer, Kapteyn, and Andreyeva, 2011 for a related 
approach; Chetty et al. (2014) also focuses on percentile rankings for income). Because the 
uniform distribution of hij is identical across countries, this also means that the estimated 
coefficient αj can be compared meaningfully across countries as well.  
Second, countries may differ with regard to the benchmark rate of health Hj, setting 
higher or lower standards for whether the individual’s disability qualifies as sufficiently serious 
to warrant financial assistance. Clearly, a higher Hj will lead to a larger population receiving 
disability. The third factor is the ratio αj/σj which captures the ability of the disability program to 
target those with poor health.  Since σj, or the standard deviation of uj, is normalized to one in our 
Probit regressions, we interpret the estimated α as the combined effect of both. If the application 
process is a pure lottery, the estimate of α will be zero, while if the selection process is nearly 
                                                  
6 It is not entirely clear how to interpret β; it may reflect preferences of individuals, or discrimination on 
the part of disability boards. In our analysis below, we assume that our primary interest is in comparing 
disability based on health and functionality, and not with regard to age or sex. Furthermore, as we show 
below, the age and sex composition of our countries are very similar.  
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deterministic and targeted to those in poor health, the ratio will be large in magnitude.  In 
practice, we allow for the magnitude of α to vary across the distribution of health.  
In the results below, we show the entire distribution of DI recipiency by country across 
all health percentiles, but also calculate several summary statistics that capture the degree to 
which the DI programs target those in worse health.  One approach is to consider average health 
conditional on enrollment in a DI program:  
(2)   ( ) | ( )DI ij j ij ij j ijE h X h H um b a= + - >   
Rearranging, and summing over each of the Nj individuals in the sample for country j  
(3)  
1
( ( ) )
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where P(i) is the cumulative percentile measure of individual i’s health status and F the normal 
cumulative distribution.  Ignoring X for the moment, and noting that the weighting function P(i) 
is similar across countries, in general the average percentile health of those on DI will be higher 
in country j the smaller in magnitude is αj/σj, and the smaller is Hj, or the cutoff point for 
eligibility.  In other words, countries where it is easier to gain DI coverage, and where targeting 
is less focused, will tend to exhibit higher measures of average health conditional on DI receipt.7  
 A measure that captures a different aspect of targeting is the fraction of those in some 
percentile P of the health distribution covered by DI.  That is,  
(4)     ( ( ) ) | *
jDI j ij ij j ij ij
E X h H u h Pl b a= + - > <  
                                                  
7 We acknowledge that comparing means of percentiles across countries may lead to biases if for example 
the variance of true “health” differs across countries. 
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That is, when P* = 0.10, for example, or the bottom decile of the health distribution, then 
jDI
l  
captures the fraction of people in that bottom decile enrolled in DI, and thus captures the 
porousness of the safety net. There is no theoretical basis for choosing a P*, and so we choose 
somewhat arbitrarily the bottom decile of the health distribution for people aged 50-64 as those 
potentially appropriate for a safety-net.  
Our final and third approach is to estimate αj/σj directly using Probit estimation methods 
that adjust for characteristics of individuals, Xij, that may differ between DI enrollees and non-
enrollees.  More realistically, disability insurance applications and approvals could also be 
affected by job market opportunities; a college graduate with muscle weakness may be less likely 
to qualify for disability insurance compared to a manual laborer who didn’t finish high school. In 
this case, the estimating reduced form equation can be written  
(5)  
otherwiseY
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where labor market opportunities are reflected in the potential market wage wij relative to the 
country-specific wage deemed relevant for disability insurance, Wj.  Given the difficulty in 
measuring wages for people not in the labor force, in the empirical analysis we proxy wij using 
education.  Since higher wages make DI insurance applications less likely to qualify, we 
hypothesize that γ < 0.  
 
3. Data 
We use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and 
the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for the years 2004, 2006, 2010, and 2012 (waves 1, 
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2, 4, and 5 for SHARE and waves 7, 8, 10, and 11 for HRS).8 9 For Europe, we focus on the ten 
European countries that participated in every wave of SHARE. They are a balanced 
representation of the various regions in Europe, ranging from Scandinavia (Sweden and 
Denmark) through Western and Central Europe (the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Switzerland and Austria) to the Mediterranean (Spain and Italy).  Properties of the SHARE data, 
such as response rates and sample sizes, have been reported elsewhere (e.g., Börsch-Supan, 
2007).  About two-thirds of the variables in SHARE are identical to variables in HRS, and most 
of the remainder is fairly comparable (Börsch-Supan, 2007).  
Disability insurance is defined as all branches of publicly financed insurances against the 
loss of the ability to perform gainful employment. Receipt of disability benefits is determined by 
                                                  
8 This paper uses data from SHARE wave 4 release 1.1.1 (March 2013), SHARE wave 1 and 2 release 
2.5.0 (May 2011) and  SHARELIFE release 1 (November 2010).  The SHARE data collection has been 
primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th Framework Programme (project QLK6-
CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme Quality of Life), through the 6th Framework Programme 
(projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5- CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, 
CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and through the 7th Framework Programme (SHARE-PREP, N° 211909, 
SHARE-LEAP, N° 227822 and SHARE M4, N° 261982). Additional funding from the U.S. National 
Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, R21 AG025169, 
Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG BSR06-11 and OGHA 04-064) and the German Ministry of Education and 
Research as well as from various national sources is gratefully acknowledged (see www.share-project.org 
for a full list of funding institutions).  
 
9 Most SHARE countries were on a harmonized bi-annual schedule. However, the schedule of fieldwork 
in the different countries depended on the timing of partially de-centralized funding. SHARE wave 1 was 
fielded mostly in 2004, with some interviews taking place in 2005. SHARE wave 2 was fielded in 2006 
and 2007. SHARE wave 4 was fielded mostly in 2011 with some interviews taking place in 2010 and in 
2012. SHARE wave 5 was fielded in 2013. HRS wave 7 was collected in 2004 and 2005, wave 8 in 2006 
and 2007, wave 10 in 2010 and 2011, and wave 11 in 2012 and 2013. For brevity, in this paper, we will 
use the first year of data collection in HRS to refer to survey fielded on the same years, and 2012 to refer 
to refer to SHARE wave 5 and HRS wave 11. 
In this paper we associate SHARE wave 1 and HRS wave 7 with 2004, SHARE wave 2 and HRS wave 8 
with 2006, SHARE wave 4 and , HRS wave 10 with 2010,  and, finally, SHARE wave 5 and HRS wave 
11 with  2012. The 2008/2009 wave of SHARE (Wave 3- SHARELIFE), was designed to capture 
information about respondents' life histories, and contained very different questions from the other waves. 
We therefore excluded these years from both data sources. 
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responses to questions specific to each survey.10  For HRS respondents, we use a derived 
variable provided by RAND that describes the respondent's disability status in each wave.  
Respondents are considered to be receiving disability benefits if this variable indicates that they 
were currently receiving benefits from SSI, SSDI, or both.  For SHARE respondents, we 
determine disability benefit receipt by recoding answers to country-specific questions about 
receipt of public disability benefits.11   
Our analysis depends critically on measuring health status.  Perhaps the most commonly 
used measure of health status is self-reported health. This indicator, however, has potential 
shortcomings, such as a lack of reliability (Crossley and Kennedy, 2002), potential self-reporting 
biases (although see Benitez et al., 2004), difficulty in comparing across countries (Banks et al., 
                                                  
10 In SHARE’s first wave, several countries asked DI and accidents/sickness benefits separately, but from 
Wave 2 onward, DI and accidents/sickness benefits are asked in the same question. Sickness benefits are 
typically made when an individual employee is unable to work as a result of a medical condition and the 
resulting reduction in earnings is compensated (in full, or in part). Eligibility is generally established 
based on an insurance record. It is assumed that the inability to work as a result of the medical condition 
will be temporary and that a return to work can be expected. If the medical condition turns out to be long-
standing, and a return to work is therefore unlikely, the claimant will typically be transferred to a 
disability insurance payment (e.g. invalidity or incapacity benefit). The amount might be flat or earnings-
related.   
 
11 Following Borsch-Supan et al. (2016), the DI institutions considered in each country are the following: 
Staatliche Invaliditäts- bzw. Berufsunfähigkeitspension, Versehrtenrente oder Krankengeld (aus der 
Haupt- und Nebenbeschäftigung) in Austria, Wettelijke/ Aanvullende uitkering bij ziekte of invaliditeit of 
wettelijke uitkering bij beroepsziekte of arbeidsongeval, Allocation/pension maladie/invalidité/incapacité 
légale, Deuxième assurance maladie/invalidité/incapacité légale in Belgium, Rente de l’assurance 
invalidité (AI), Rente der Invalidenversicherung (IV), and Rendita invalidità (AI) in Switzerland, 
Erwerbsminderungsrente bzw. Beamtenpension wegen Dienstunfähigkeit, oder Krankengeld in Germany, 
Førtidspension, including sygedagpenge in Denmark, Pensión pública de invalidez/incapacidad or 
prestación pública por enfermedad, Segunda pensión pública de invalidez/incapacidad or segunda 
prestación pública por enfermedad; Pensió pública d'’invalidesa / incapacitat or prestació pública per 
malaltia, Segona pensió pública d'invalidesa / incapacitat o segona prestació pública per malaltia in Spain, 
Pension d'invalidité publique (including rente d'accident du travail and  allocation supplémentaire 
d'invalidité)  in France, Συνταξη αναπηρ  ´´ιας in Greece, Indennità pubblica di disabilità; and pensione 
pubblica di invalidità or di inabilità  (including assegno di accompagnamento) in Italy,  WAO, Waz, 
WIA, and other invaliditeitspensioen  in the Netherlands, Sjukersättning (förtidspension) and sjukbidrag 
in Sweden, SSDI and SSI disability pension in the United States (US). 
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2004; Kapteyn, Smith and van Soest, 2009), and limited granularity because everyone is sorted 
into just 4 or 5 categories. Instead, we exploit the richness of health-related information available 
in both SHARE and HRS to create several health indices based on the methodology introduced 
by Poterba, Venti and Wise (2010, 2011, 2013).12 Their approach views “true” health as a latent 
construct for which several noisy measures are available.  They begin with a large number of 
variables that are assumed to be related to the underlying health status, perform a principal 
component analysis on them and obtain the first principal component of these indicators. They 
use this first principal component as a health index measure.   
We expand on this approach to allow for cross country comparisons.  We pool data 
across years and perform separate principle components analyses for each country. We retain the 
first principal component and use this to create country- and year-specific percentile scores for 
each respondent.13  
Our main index, denoted PVW, follows closely the construction of the variant of their 
index proposed in Poterba, Venti and Wise (2013). We use 23 different items which provide a 
large amount of health-related information, including body mass index (BMI), nine indicators for 
functional health limitations (difficulties in walking 1 block in HRS or 100 meters in SHARE, 
sitting, getting up from a chair, climbing stairs, lifting heavy objects, picking  a coin from a table, 
raising arms over head, pushing/pulling large objects), one indicator for having problems with at 
least one activity of daily living (ADL), indicators for having experienced chronic diseases or 
conditions (high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung diseases, heart problems, stroke, arthritis, 
psychological problems), indicators for the use of health care services in the past year or two 
                                                  
12 See Kapteyn and Meijer (2014) for an insightful review of alternative approaches. 
13 We do not adjust for age (aside from considering just ages 50-64 across countries) to capture true health 
(rather than health conditional on age); in practice the distribution of ages across countries is very similar 
(see Table 1).  
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(having visited a doctor, an hospital or a nursing home), and having had back pain (Appendix 
Table A.1).   
To capture the complex relationship between disability and health, we construct 
additional indices of health status. Our second approach, which we call the “ML” index, 
addresses the issue that disability arises from the interaction of an individual’s functional status 
and the environment, focusing on a set of indicators that emphasizes functional ability, as in 
Mont and Leob (2010). This is based on 22 items, including the same nine indicators for 
functional health limitations used in PVW, but more detailed information on limitations with 
ADL (separate indicators for difficulties with dressing, bathing, walking across a room, eating, 
getting out of bed ad using the toilet), as well as indicators for difficulties with instrumental 
activities of daily living (IADLs), such as the ability to use a map, use a phone, manage money, 
manage medications, shopping, or prepare one’s own meals, and the presence of health problems 
limiting work or the usual activities, and excluding diagnosed diseases, which conversely are 
included in the PVW index (Appendix Table A.1).  
Mental disorders are among the most common causes of disability (OECD, 2012), and 
someone with a severe mental illness may be unable to work, despite being in otherwise robust 
health. We construct a third index, meant to capture mental health with a strong focus on mental 
health and depression (MHD hereafter) which relies on the set of questions used to construct the 
CES-D depression score in HRS and the Euro-D depression score in SHARE (Appendix Table 
A.1).14   
                                                  
14 Recall that while the questions asked in the U.S. and in SHARE countries are not identical, we only need 
to assume that the battery of questions rank individuals similarly within the country.   
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Finally, we also consider a fourth hybrid summary index that is the minimum of these 
three indices, suitably rescaled in percentile terms, reflecting the idea that a bad score along just 
one of these dimensions will qualify the individual for disability insurance as well as making it 
very difficult for them to work.  
In the empirical analysis, we focus on individuals aged between 50 and 64 in each wave. 
We consider individuals until age 65 because in all the countries of our sample, disability 
insurance benefits are automatically converted to old age pension benefits at age 65. We drop all 
respondents with missing values for our dependent variable (whether receiving disability 
payments) or at least one of the variables used in the health indices. Thus, the final sample 
consists of an unbalanced sample of 63,929 person-waves from SHARE and 32,555 person-
waves from the HRS. Actual regression samples may be smaller due to individuals with key Xij 
variables that are missing. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis, by 
country. The gender composition of our sample is fairly balanced across countries. Respondents 
on average are 57 years old in every country. Between 71 (Austria) and 80 (Italy) percent of 
them are married.  One variable that shows a remarkable degree of heterogeneity across 
countries is the proportion of individuals self-reporting being retired: one out of 10 Swiss and 
Dutch, compared to about one out of five in the US and Belgium, and 41.5 percent in Austria 
(Gruber and Wise, 1998).  
Educational attainments for these cohorts of individuals are also fairly different across 
countries. Education for the SHARE cohorts was split into primary, secondary, and tertiary 
relying on the ISCED-97 coding provided.15   For the HRS, primary corresponds to 11 years of 
                                                  
15  The SHARE generated variables files provide the 1997 International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED-97) coding. We combined the ISCED-97 codes 0 (none), 1 (primary education), 2 
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education or less, secondary to 12 years, and tertiary to more than 12 years of education. The 
U.S. has the largest share of individuals having attained a tertiary level of education (58.5%). At 
the other extreme, the Mediterranean countries in our sample, Spain and Italy, have the largest 
share of individuals with a primary level of education (69.6% and 61.2%, respectively). 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Cross sectional analysis 
Table 2 shows summary statistics for individuals aged 50-64 receiving Disability 
Insurance by country. Disability Insurance enrollment rates vary widely across countries, with 
the 2004-12 average percentage of those receiving DI benefits ranging from less than 3 percent 
in France to more than 16 percent in Sweden. The US enrollment rate (9.7 percent) is only 
slightly higher than the European SHARE average of 8.5 percent. 
Figure 1a provides a comparison of the distribution of DI enrollees by PVW health status 
index decile, for the entire 2004-12 data, for two countries with similar fractions of people age 
50-64 with disability benefits, the U.S. (9.7%), and Belgium (9.2%).  The distribution of benefits 
in the U.S. is skewed more to the left, meaning that a larger fraction of DI benefits accrue to 
people who report worse health. Note the relatively high fraction of Belgium enrollees who 
report health status above the median decile. Similarly, Figure 1b compares Austria and 
Switzerland, again two countries with similar sized DI programs; Switzerland exhibits better 
(more targeted) coverage of those in the bottom health deciles and lower (more targeted) 
coverage of those in the highest health deciles.  
                                                  
(lower secondary education), into one category (“primary”), the codes 3 (upper secondary education) and 
4 (post-secondary, non-tertiary education) into another category (“secondary”), and categories 5 (first 
stage of tertiary education) and 6 (second stage of tertiary education) into yet another category 
(“tertiary”). See separate Data Appendix for further details (not yet completed). 
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The fraction of individuals in the bottom decile of the health distribution covered by DI is 
shown in Table 2 by country.  (The same information can be found in Figures 1a and 1b for the 
four selected countries.) Sweden (0.63) and Denmark (0.52) do the best with regard to covering 
this group, but the U.S. (0.51) is not far behind; France (0.12) is the least successful in covering 
those in the bottom decile.  
Successful targeting of those in the poorest health implies a high fraction in the lowest 
decile covered by DI (λDI), and (condition on λDI) a low average percentile health level (μDI).  
Figure 2 shows the 11 countries in our sample arrayed by their value for λDI and μDI; the 
horizontal axis is in reverse so that the right side is lower and hence more desirable; the ideal 
would be in the Northeast corner of the graph. Rather than attempt to develop societal tradeoffs 
between λDI and μDI (which may differ across countries, and would likely depend on the marginal 
social costs of raising taxes to fund such programs), we instead seek to characterize DI systems 
that are more or less efficient in targeting; a DI program to the Southwest of another would be 
considered less efficient under any weighting of λDI and μDI.  For example, according to Figure 2, 
Denmark would be ranked better in targeting than Spain, and Spain in turn better than France. 
Comparing DI systems with higher and lower overall coverage rates (e.g., Sweden versus Italy) 
would be more problematic, since DI system with a higher enrollment rate will tend to 
experience a higher average percentile health (μDI) and a higher fraction in poor health covered 
(λDI), thus drifting towards the Northwest.  
Table 2 also includes the OECD (2003, 2010) indicators, with the first capturing the 
generosity/compensation of the program (OECDg), and the second on employment or integration 
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(OECDe).16  The generosity/compensation indicator focuses on dimensions such as the coverage 
of the program, the extent of disability needed to qualify for benefit entitlement, the duration and 
size of compensation, the type of medical assessment (if any) required to certify disability, and 
the extent of vocational assessment.  The employment/integration indicator focuses on the whole 
range of employment and rehabilitation measures, such as the type and extent of employment 
support, the timing and comprehensiveness of vocational rehabilitation programs, and the work 
incentives provided for beneficiaries. Table 2 shows that for generosity, Sweden leads the list 
(with a score of 37 out of 50), followed by the Netherlands (32) and Switzerland (32), and with 
the U.S. the least generous (17). The employment/integration indicator (OECDe) is highest in 
Denmark (37) and lowest in Italy (18). The correlation coefficients between the OECDg and 
OECDe composite measures, and our primary measure of DI disability, is modest; between 0.34 
and 0.45 (and none significant), so while we appear to be capturing a common element across 
countries, the correlation among the measures is not large.17 
4.2 Alternative measures of insurance coverage 
 Many countries rely more on other pension programs beside just their DI program, and so 
it is useful to consider also broader classifications of pension support beyond DI.  Borghans, 
Gielen, and Luttmer (2014), for example, demonstrate considerable substitution between DI 
benefits and other forms of social insurance.  Figure 2a shows the distribution of pension, 
unemployment insurance, DI, and other support in France and Denmark by health status decile 
                                                  
16 Each of the two policy dimensions is divided into ten sub-dimensions. The sub-dimensions are all given 
equal weight and the same score range, from 0 to 5 points. The points for each sub-dimension are then 
added to obtain the overall score, with 50 being the possible maximum score for each indicator. 
17 The lack of strong correlation might appear to be the consequence of different “snapshots” of 
generosity or employment programs in the 2000s, rather than our data which covers 2004-2012. However, 
even when we limit our data to earlier years, the correlation is relatively weak.  
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(using the PVW index).  The red area shows the additional coverage by non-DI public pensions, 
the green next area reflecting private pensions, and the remaining top segment the share of the 
decile not receiving any pension.   
It is clear that the low reliance on DI programs in France is offset by the use of other 
social welfare programs such as unemployment insurance, particularly in comparison to 
Denmark. However, the non-DI support does not strongly target those in the worst health, so that 
in France, half of those in the bottom health decile receive no support from the government.  
These results are consistent with Arrighi et al. (2015) who find evidence that applicants can be 
discouraged by local semi-autonomous County Councils policies that include setting low 
benefits. By contrast, in Denmark nearly 80 percent of the bottom health decile are receiving 
some kind of support.  That rates of DI and pension/UI support among the healthiest decile are 
20% in both Denmark and France suggests more effective targeting of resources to the disabled 
in Denmark. 
 We return to the comparison between Belgium and the U.S., two countries with similar 
sized DI programs, in Figure 3b.  A pattern similar to the earlier comparison in Figure 1a is 
apparent; three-quarters of those in the bottom health decile receive some kind of support in the 
U.S. compared to 67 percent in Belgium, while support in the (e.g.) 7th health decile in Belgium, 
39 percent, is substantially above the corresponding support in the U.S., 23 percent. The higher 
overall support across health deciles in Belgium cannot be entirely attributed to early retirement, 
as the U.S. retirement rate in our sample, 20 percent, is only slightly below that in Belgium, 23 
percent (Table 1). 
 Retirement rates are quite different in Switzerland (10 percent) and Austria (40 percent).  
Figure 3c shows how the distribution of non-DI pensions and other government support is fairly 
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consistent across health deciles in Austria, leading to higher rates of support in the bottom health 
decile (69 percent compared to 51 percent). That said, in Switzerland only 13 percent receive 
some benefit among the healthiest decile, compared to 26 percent in Austria.  The distribution of 
benefits across deciles of health status in additional countries are provided in Figure 3d.   
4.3. Alternative measures of health status 
Table 3 provides measures of the average percentile of those on DI for the PVW measure 
(Column 1), the Mont-Loeb (ML) index of functionality (Column 2), the mental 
health/depression index (Column 3), and the minimum score, suitably renormalized (Column 4). 
One issue with these alternative measures is that many more individuals are likely to bunch up in 
the healthiest group, since (for example) a large fraction of the population do not report any 
symptoms of depression.  To ensure that the percentiles can be compared across these four 
categories, we renormalize so that the mean percentile of the sample is still equal to 50.5.18   
The PVW and ML indices tend to rank individuals quite similarly (r>0.8), and each is 
also positively correlated, but less strongly, with the MHD index.  For most countries, the 
average percentile for the ML measure was comparable to, or even slightly less than, the PVW 
average percentile, providing support for the Mont and Loeb (2011) view that functionality is a 
good predictor of DI enrollment.  We provide additional sensitivity analysis in Appendix Tables 
A.2 and A.3 by health definition and year.  
4.4 Regression Analysis 
We next estimate αj/σj in a Probit model, separately for each country and for the entire 
SHARE sample. We control for characteristics of the respondents (Xij) such as age, gender, 
                                                  
18 For example, if there were 42 percent of the healthiest people in country j reporting no depression 
symptoms, then each of them would be assigned a percentile value of 79 rather than 58. 
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marital status, self-reported retirement status, and report results in Table 4 as marginal effects 
using the PVW index as the measure of health hij (there was little appreciable difference when 
we used the ML index).  Because the distribution of the health percentiles are similar across 
countries, we can compare the magnitude of the αj coefficients estimates across countries.19   We 
allow for nonlinearity in α by using dummy variables for the bottom three deciles of health status 
(the excluded reference group are individuals whose health status are above that 30th percent 
group).20  Focusing on the coefficients for Decile 1 of health, the largest magnitude coefficients 
are in Denmark (0.481), Sweden (0.478), the Netherlands (0.441) and the U.S. (0.426).  Even at 
Decile 3 of health, there is a considerably higher probability of DI receipt in Denmark (0.144), 
Sweden (0.128) and the Netherlands (0.132), with the marginal effects for this decile 
considerably smaller in other countries.  Across countries, the Spearman rank-order correlation 
statistic is highly significant between λDI and the α coefficient for Decile 1 (0.94, p < .001).   
Table 5 reports Probit estimates for the models in (2), expanding the specifications in 
table 4 to include education as a measure of labor market opportunities.  In most countries, the 
weight placed on education is modest, suggesting that conditional on health, a tertiary education 
reduces the chance of DI receipt by 3 percentage points or less. The exception is Denmark, 
where the coefficient for tertiary education is highly significant and predicts a reduced likelihood 
of receiving DI benefits by 11 percentage points.  This likely reflects differences in policies 
towards encouraging people who are not in perfect health to continue working in Denmark.   As 
an OECD (2009) study found,  
                                                  
19 Of course, differences across countries in the level of DI enrollment will mean that two countries with 
similar estimates of α (in probabilities) will differ with regard to relative risk or odds ratios.   
 
20 Additional decile measures were not generally significant and did not affect education coefficients.  
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The disability scheme in Denmark which was reformed in 2003 incorporates a most 
fundamental conceptual shift. Disability assessment is now focused on what a 
person can do rather than their loss of capacity; more precisely, the extent to which 
a person is able to carry out a subsidised job (a so-called “flex-job”). A disability 
benefit is only granted where capacity is held to be permanently reduced to the 
extent that a flex-job cannot be performed, and participation in rehabilitation would 
not help to restore this capacity. In determining capacity, a comprehensive 
individual resource profile is being put together which includes measures of health, 
social and labour market proximity criteria. In this respect, Denmark is a best-
practice example within the OECD (p. 19). 
 
 In other words, Denmark is the only country in our sample that has successfully targeted 
DI benefits to older people with weak work skills as well as to those in poor health. 
4.5 Secular changes in DI enrollment and targeting  
We also consider changes over time in DI enrollment, λDI, and μDI across countries.  
Figure 4a exhibits DI enrollment rates in 5 countries; two with remarkably similar patterns of 
decline -- Denmark and the Netherlands, two with similar patterns of increase – Belgium and the 
U.S., and the fifth, Sweden, which by 2012 had the largest share (18 percent) of this age group 
covered by disability insurance.  While Denmark and the Netherlands each began in 2004 with 
roughly double the DI rates of Belgium and the U.S., by 2012 their DI rates were nearly 
identical. In Denmark, the decline reflected longer-term trends in employment and other factors 
(Bingley et al., 2014), but in the Netherlands, this decline in enrollment rates was the 
consequence of a fundamental reform in their DI program; Koning and Lindebloom (2015) find, 
like we do, that the success of the Netherlands reforms were associated with both a sharp decline 
in the number of people on disability, as well as a drop in the percentage of those in the bottom 
decile of health status that were covered through the DI program, shown in Figure 4b.21  While 
                                                  
21 Garcia Mandico et. al (2016) show that, following the disability insurance reform, those with 
musculoskeletal diseases had more success in going back to work than those with mental illness.   
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the time-series data is less precisely measured than the aggregated cross-section data, the fraction 
covered by DI in the lowest health decile declined between 2004-12 substantially in the 
Netherlands (from 52 to 42 percent) and even more in Denmark (from 62 to 45 percent).  These 
secular declines are attenuated when considering any support; see Appendix Table A.3.  
Conversely, there was a rise in coverage for lowest health decile associated with 
expanding U.S. coverage (e.g., Autor and Duggan, 2006), and Belgium coverage, and especially 
in Sweden, which by 2012 covered the highest fraction of people (71.5 percent) in the bottom 
decile of health (Figure 4b). Finally, Figure 4c shows little change in the average health of those 
on disability, except for the Netherlands which shows a substantial decline from 27 to 23 percent 
(Appendix Table A.2), suggesting a reduction in eligibility among more healthy recipients.   
5.  Discussion and Conclusion  
There are few objective approaches to monitoring the characteristics of public disability 
insurance programs across countries and over time.  In this paper, we study the reported health 
and work opportunities of the population age 50-64 enrolled in a disability insurance (DI) 
program across a sample of 10 European countries and the United States.  We observed 
considerable differences across countries with regard to the composition of people eligible for DI 
benefits relative to those without DI benefits.  While previous work has sought to describe the 
institutional features of individual country-level programs, as in OECD (2003, 2010), this paper 
uses a flexible semi-parametric approach to quantify characteristics of DI programs based on 
micro-level data from SHARE and the HRS for DI enrollees and non-enrollees. 
The variations across countries do not appear to be explained either by labor market 
considerations – that is, that some countries are more likely to insure against poor labor market 
opportunities than others – or by alternative social insurance programs that supplement disability 
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programs.  Whether these differences reflect societal preferences for other goals effected through 
the use of disability insurance, imperfect screening (e.g., Mitra, 2005), or more general random 
variability in the disability application and appeal process (as in Maestas, Mullen and Strand, 
2013, and French and Song, 2014), is not clear.  Nonetheless, we believe that these objective 
measures of disability insurance targeting are useful metrics that can be used to assess the 
performance of country-level disability programs at a point in time, and over time. 
To our knowledge, we are the first to quantify targeting efficiency of DI programs across 
a range of developed countries.  Denmark and the U.S. appeared to be quite effective in targeting 
DI benefits to those in the poorest health, while France and Belgium appear to be less effective in 
targeting DI benefits. It may appear surprising that the U.S. DI program appeared to be so 
successful in targeting, given the very long waiting period and extensive appeals for people with 
what appear to be serious disabilities (Eckholm, 2007).  In one view, the difficult process of 
applications in the U.S. could be a successful screen to prevent healthy individuals from 
applying. A more worrisome interpretation of the U.S. data is that the long periods of time not 
working during applications and appeals have an adverse impact on work capacity (as shown by 
Maestas, Mullen and Strand, 2013), which in turn would be plausibly associated with adverse 
effects on measured health status. In this hypothetical case, the restrictive DI enrollment process 
causes poor health among enrollees.  
We also developed a regression model that captures differences across countries in the 
degree to which they weight health status versus market opportunities.  For example, even 
holding health status constant, Denmark shows a much stronger gradient of DI eligibility by 
education, suggesting that even disabled college graduates are encouraged to find work.  Most 
countries, however, showed only modest differences (or none at all) in DI eligibility across 
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education groups, and the U.S. system in particular appears to discourage work effort 
(Burkhauser and Daly, 2011). The recent successes of supported employment in the U.S. and 
Europe, by which mentally disabled people are encouraged to return to appropriate work, shows 
considerable promise (Burns et al, 2007), and there is at least suggestive evidence that at least in 
the U.S., such programs can pay for themselves by reducing disability and medical costs (Drake, 
et al., 2009). 
There are several limitations to this study.  The first is that our information is limited to 
enrollment, and not the level of benefits. Partial disability payments among those in better health 
may be consistent with government objectives, and thus explain why some countries appear to 
have enrolled so many who report themselves to be in relatively good health.  Yet these countries 
do not appear to be much better at covering less healthy people, who would likely benefit 
substantially from even modest DI payments. As well, low disability rates could have a 
secondary impact on the demand for applying for benefits, as in Arrighi et al. (2015).  
Second, the health status indices may not fully reflect the ability to work, particularly 
when interacted with the type of industry.  A broken leg will be more of a problem for 
construction workers than for computer programmers.  This is not a problem if the degree of bias 
is similar across countries, but we do not know the magnitude of such bias.   
A third concern would be if measures of health care are intrinsically ordinal, so that using 
percentiles abstracts from real differences in health across countries. For example, someone in 
the 15th percentile in the U.S. may be in much poorer health than someone in the 15th percentile 
in England (e.g., Banks et al., 2006), complicating comparisons across countries.  To minimize 
such biases, we focus on relative measures of support (that is, comparing DI support for the 1st 
decile with the 10th decile) and on temporal changes in the same country.   
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The primary concern of many policy makers has been with the rapid and unsustainable 
growth in DI programs worldwide that do not appear to be associated with worsening health 
(Milligan and Wise, 2012; Borsch-Supan, 2007, 2011; Börsch-Supan and Roth, 2011).  Our new 
measures of disability insurance efficiency cannot answer the question of what is the appropriate 
size of DI programs in a particular country, which is fundamentally a political issue.  But our 
new measures can at a minimum provide an objective approach to measuring the extent to which 
DI programs target those in the poorest health and least able to work.  
More importantly, the longitudinal nature of the SHARE and HRS data allow policy 
makers to monitor the consequences of disability insurance reform to better understand the 
consequences of reducing DI enrollment in response to budgetary pressures, especially as new 
waves become available.  Amartya Sen (1995), writing about the targeting of income transfers to 
the poor, identified a key tradeoff between the “type II error of including the nonpoor among the 
poor” and the “type I errors of not including some real poor among the listed poor.” In the 
context of disability policy, it is impossible to judge the success of a given policy reform, and the 
ability to avoid what Sen terms Type I and Type II errors, without objective longer-term 
monitoring of the health of DI recipients and non-recipients.  This paper provides a new 
framework for providing systematic measures of program targeting that allows for comparing DI 
programs both across countries and over time.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, 2004-12 
 
Country N Male Age Fraction Married 
Fraction 
Retired 
Primary 
Education 
Tertiary 
Education 
Sweden 5,200 0.504 57.4 0.716 0.131 0.307 0.310 
  (0.007) (0.054) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Denmark 5,657 0.495 57.0 0.757 0.162 0.145 0.441 
  (0.007) (0.055) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Germany 6,474 0.494 57.1 0.749 0.173 0.103 0.318 
  (0.006) (0.051) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Netherlands 6,584 0.497 57.1 0.784 0.108 0.420 0.291 
  (0.006) (0.050) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Belgium 9,198 0.497 56.8 0.750 0.228 0.381 0.326 
  (0.005) (0.043) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
France 8,027 0.487 56.9 0.770 0.266 0.330 0.252 
  (0.006) (0.045) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Switzerland 4,519 0.496 57.0 0.725 0.097 0.248 0.157 
  (0.007) (0.060) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Austria 5,640 0.491 57.2 0.706 0.415 0.198 0.255 
  (0.007) (0.052) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Spain 6,241 0.492 56.7 0.771 0.127 0.696 0.141 
  (0.006) (0.053) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Italy 6,389 0.483 57.0 0.804 0.279 0.612 0.087 
  (0.006) (0.052) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
US 32,555 0.48 57.3 0.72 0.2 0.13 0.58 
  (0.003) (0.021) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
 
Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE wave 1, 2, 4, and 5; and HRS waves 7, 8, 10, 11. Based on pooled 
sample of respondents age 50 through 64 in each wave. Percentage values, except for Age (average age). Retired 
based on self-reported labor market activity.  
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Table 2: Percentage of Population Receiving Disability and Pension Benefits, Fraction of 
DI Recipients in Bottom 10% of PVW Health Status, and OECD Disability Scores: 2004-12 
 
Country Fraction on DI 
Any DI, UI, 
or Pension 
Mean 
Percentile of 
those 
receiving DI 
Fraction 
receiving DI 
in bottom 
decile  
OECDg OECDe 
Sweden 0.157 0.341 22.5 0.625 37 32 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.8) (0.021)   
Denmark 0.132 0.330 22.0 0.521 28 37 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.9) (0.021)   
Germany 0.07 0.30 25.6 0.22 24 35 
 (0.003) (0.006) (1.1) (0.016)   
Netherlands 0.13 0.32 24.9 0.44 32 35 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.8) (0.020)   
Belgium 0.092 0.428 25.0 0.347 25 24 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.8) (0.015)   
France 0.028 0.335 26.5 0.119 25 26 
 (0.002) (0.005) (1.8) (0.011)   
Switzerland 0.06 0.20 17.1 0.34 32 27 
 (0.004) (0.006) (1.2) (0.022)   
Austria 0.07 0.48 26.3 0.25 24 30 
 (0.003) (0.007) (1.2) (0.019)   
Spain 0.08 0.28 24.7 0.29 27 22 
 (0.003) (0.006) (1.1) (0.018)   
Italy 0.046 0.325 20.4 0.204 26 18 
 (0.003) (0.006) (1.3) (0.015)   
US 0.097 0.331 15.0 0.507 17 21 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.3) (0.008)   
 
Percentage of individuals receiving disability insurance (column 1), receiving any public pension (column 
2), receiving any pension (column 3), average PVW health index of individuals receiving DI (column 4), 
percentage of individuals receiving DI who are in the bottom 10% of PVW health index (column 5), 
OECD generosity (compensation) score (column 6) and employment (integration) score (column 7).  
Standard errors in parentheses.  Source: OECD (2010) and authors' calculations using SHARE wave 1, 2, 
4, 5 and HRS wave 7, 8, 10, 11. All estimates, except for OECD scores, are population-weighted. 
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Table 3: Average Health Percentile for Those on DI Using Alternative Measures of Health 
Status, by Country: 2004-12 
 
  
Country PVW Index 
ML 
Functional 
Status 
Depression 
Score 
Minimum 
of Three 
Indices 
(Rescaled) 
Sweden 22.5 21.5 33.0 21.9 
 (0.8) (0.7) (0.9) (0.7) 
Denmark 22.0 20.9 32.0 21.2 
 (0.9) (0.8) (1.0) (0.7) 
Germany 25.6 25.1 34.7 24.3 
 (1.1) (1.1) (1.4) (1.1) 
Netherlands 24.9 25.8 36.1 25.4 
 (0.8) (0.8) (1.0) (0.8) 
Belgium 25.0 24.5 33.3 23.6 
 (0.8) (0.8) (0.9) (0.8) 
France 26.5 24.2 35.7 23.0 
 (1.8) (1.6) (1.8) (1.5) 
Switzerland 17.1 17.3 30.2 17.7 
 (1.2) (1.3) (1.7) (1.3) 
Austria 26.3 25.8 35.0 25.8 
 (1.2) (1.1) (1.4) (1.1) 
Spain 24.7 24.5 34.1 23.1 
 (1.1) (1.1) (1.4) (1.0) 
Italy 20.4 18.6 34.0 20.1 
 (1.3) (1.2) (1.8) (1.3) 
US 15.0 13.5 28.4 16.1 
 (0.3) (0.2) (0.4) (0.3) 
 
Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE wave 1, 2, 4, 5 and HRS wave 7, 8, 10, 11. Standard 
errors in parentheses.  
 
  
 
 
 
Table 4:  Probit Marginal Effects – Model 1 – PVW Health Index 
 
 
 
  
SHARE SE DK DE NL BE FR CH AT ES IT US 
Health index             
   Decile 1 0.325 0.478 0.481 0.266 0.441 0.318 0.127 0.337 0.173 0.299 0.213 0.426 
 (0.008) (0.027) (0.028) (0.022) (0.026) (0.02) (0.016) (0.031) (0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.01) 
   Decile 2 0.161 0.281 0.327 0.156 0.227 0.147 0.053 0.094 0.067 0.147 0.085 0.228 
 (0.007) (0.027) (0.028) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018) (0.013) (0.022) (0.017) (0.023) (0.017) (0.009) 
   Decile 3 0.084 0.128 0.144 0.085 0.132 0.066 0.018 0.044 0.07 0.088 0.056 0.102 
 (0.006) (0.025) (0.025) (0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.01) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.007) 
             
Mean  dep var 0.085 0.157 0.132 0.070 0.13 0.092 0.028 0.060 0.070 0.080 0.046 0.097 
N obs 44832 4072 3809 5401 4725 6303 5179 2776 3642 4371 4554 30973 
 
Dependent variable: 1 if receives DI benefits, 0 otherwise.  PVW Health index. All specifications include the following additional covariates: dummy variables 
for male, age groups 55-59 and 60-64, marital status, retired, interview year. Regressions on the whole SHARE sample include also country dummies. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE wave 1, 2, 4, 5 and HRS wave 7, 8, 10, 11. Based on pooled sample of respondents aged  50 through 64 in 
each wave. 
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Table 5:  Probit Marginal Effects – Model 2 – PVW Health Index 
 
 
  SHARE SE DK DE NL BE FR CH AT ES IT US 
Health index             
   Decile 1 0.313 0.456 0.445 0.267 0.413 0.298 0.138 0.31 0.181 0.274 0.21 0.422 
 (0.008) (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) (0.017) (0.031) (0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.011) 
   Decile 2 0.146 0.27 0.248 0.127 0.207 0.15 0.05 0.084 0.069 0.157 0.066 0.242 
 (0.006) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.012) (0.021) (0.017) (0.022) (0.016) (0.009) 
   Decile 3 0.064 0.047 0.069 0.062 0.101 0.063 0.023 0.024 0.07 0.066 0.041 0.114 
 (0.006) (0.022) (0.025) (0.015) (0.02) (0.015) (0.01) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.007) 
             
Education             
   Secondary -0.017 -0.004 -0.065 -0.009 -0.009 -0.019 0 -0.019 -0.012 -0.024 -0.01 -0.013 
 (0.002) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.01) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) 
   Tertiary+ -0.03 -0.015 -0.109 -0.019 -0.034 -0.028 -0.002 -0.027 -0.012 -0.035 -0.027 -0.021 
 (0.002) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.01) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
             
Mean  dep var 0.085 0.157 0.132 0.070 0.13 0.092 0.028 0.060 0.070 0.080 0.046 0.097 
N obs 44777 4070 3804 5398 4713 6300 5168 2773 3636 4364 4551 30973 
 
Dependent variable: 1 if receives DI benefits, 0 otherwise.  PVW Health index. All specifications include the following additional covariates: dummy variables 
for male, age groups 55-59 and 60-64, marital status, retired, interview year. Regressions on the whole SHARE sample include also country dummies. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE wave 1, 2, 4, 5 and HRS wave 7, 8, 10, 11.  Based on pooled sample of respondents aged 50 through 64 in each 
wave.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1a:  Percent of Population on Disability Insurance, by Health Status,  
United States and Belgium: 2004-12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b:  Percent of Population on Disability Insurance, by Health Status,  
Switzerland and Austria: 2004-12 
 
 
 
Source: Authors' calculations using SHARE wave 1 (2004/2005), wave 2 (2006/2007), wave 4 (2010/2011) and wave 5 
(2013) and HRS wave 7 (2004/2005), wave 8 (2006/2007), wave 10 (2010/2011) and wave 11 (2012/2013). Based on a 
sample of individual 50-64 respondents. PVW health index. Population-weighted data. 
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Figure 2: Average Health Percentile of DI Enrollee, and Percentage of Sickest Decile on DI, by Country: 
2004-2012  
 
 
 
 
Notes:  The horizontal axis is the average percentile health of those enrolled in disability insurance (DI) (reverse 
order), the vertical axis is the percentage of those in the bottom health decile enrolled in DI.  DE denotes 
Germany, CH Switzerland, ES Spain, AT Austria, DK Denmark, IT Italy, FR France, NL Netherland, BE 
Belgium.   
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Figure 3a: Disability Insurance Receipt, and Any Pension Receipt, by Health Decile: 
 France and Denmark, 2004-12 
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Figure 3b: Disability Insurance Receipt, and Any Pension Receipt, by Health Decile: 
 U.S., Netherlands, and Belgium, 2004-12 
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Figure 3c: Disability Insurance Receipt, and Any Pension Receipt, by Health Decile: 
Switzerland and Austria, 2004-12 
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Figure 3d: Disability Insurance Receipt, and Any Pension Receipt, by Health Decile: 
Additional Countries in Sample, 2004-12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Germany
No Pension
Non-Public Pension
Other Public
DI benefits
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Italy
No Pension
Non-Public Pension
Other Public
DI benefits
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Netherlands
No Pension
Non-Public Pension
Other Public
DI benefits
42 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3d: Disability Insurance Receipt, and Any Pension Receipt, by Health Decile: 
Additional Countries in Sample, 2004-12,  cont’d 
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Figure 4a:  Trends in Disability Insurance Enrollment as a Percentage of the Overall Population  
Aged 50-64 in 5 Selected Countries: 2004-12 
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Figure 4b: Trends in the Percentage of the Sickest Decile Covered by Disability Insurance,  
Aged 50-64 in 5 Selected Countries, 2004-2012 
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Figure 4c: Trends in Average Percentile Health of Disability Insurance Enrollees Aged 50-64 in 4 Selected 
Countries, 2004-2012 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Variables included in the indices 
 
 
 
   MHD 
 PVW ML HRS SHARE 
Health care utilization     
# hospital visits in past year (SHARE)/2 years (HRS) X    
# days in nursing home in past year (SHARE)/2 years(HRS) X    
# MD visits in past year (SHARE)/2 years (HRS) X    
Difficulties with activities of daily living (ADL)     
Dressing, including shoes and socks  X   
Bathing or showering  X   
Walking across a room  X   
Eating, cutting up food  X   
Getting in or out of bed  X   
Using the toilet, incl getting up or down  X   
At least one ADL X    
Mobility, fine motor, and functional limitations     
Walking 1 block (HRS) or 100 meters (SHARE) X X   
Difficulty sitting for 2 hours X X   
Difficulty getting up from chair X X   
Difficulty climbing a flight of stairs X X   
Difficulty stooping X X   
Difficulty lifting 10 lbs X X   
Difficulty picking up a dime X X   
Difficulty raising arms over head X X   
Difficulty pushing/pulling large object X X   
Medical history     
Ever had high blood pressure X    
Ever had diabetes X    
Ever had cancer X    
Ever had lung disease X    
Ever had heart problems X    
Ever had stroke X    
Ever had psych problems (SHARE- depression only) X    
Ever had arthritis X    
Back pain X    
Difficulties with instrumental activities of daily living (IADL)     
using a map in a strange place  X   
telephone calls  X   
managing money  X   
taking medications  X   
Shopping for groceries  X   
preparing a hot meal  X   
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Table A1: Variables included in the indices (continued) 
 
 
 
   MHD 
 PVW ML HRS SHARE 
     
CESD depression questions     
Felt depressed last week   X  
Everything was an effort last week   X  
Sleep was restless last week   X  
Was happy last week   X  
Felt lonely last week   X  
Enjoyed life last week   X  
Felt sad last week   X  
Could not get going last week   X  
EURODEP depression questions     
Sad or depressed last month    X 
Any hopes for the future    X 
Felt would rather be dead in last month    X 
Tend to blame self/feel guilty    X 
Trouble sleeping recently    X 
Loss of interest in last month    X 
Irritable recently    X 
Loss of appetite    X 
Fatigue in last month    X 
Difficulty concentrating on entertainment    X 
Difficulty concentrating on reading    X 
Enjoyed any activities recently    X 
Cried in last month    X 
Ever had depression symptoms greater than 2 weeks   X 
    
. 
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Table A.2: Average Percentile Health of People on Disability Insurance 
  Of those receiving DI benefits, mean percentile: 
Sweden Fraction DI N  PVW ML MHD Minimum 
2004 0.148 242 22.9 21.6 33.3 14.5 
2006 0.167 226 23.0 22.9 35.8 15.4 
2010 0.128 93 20.3 18.4 29.3 12.9 
2012 0.184 331 23.0 22.3 32.6 14.0 
Denmark       
2004 0.169 153 21.9 21.4 33.5 14.5 
2006 0.127 180 21.0 20.7 32.4 13.3 
2010 0.129 148 25.0 21.8 32.4 14.8 
2012 0.105 238 20.0 19.4 28.4 12.5 
Germany       
2004 0.053 80 21.1 19.6 34.8 12.7 
2006 0.061 75 28.8 29.3 35.2 17.4 
2010 0.087 42 30.3 30.8 37.5 19.7 
2012 0.075 215 21.4 19.9 31.3 13.4 
Netherlands       
2004 0.168 262 27.5 26.9 34.4 17.0 
2006 0.134 185 24.9 27.5 34.6 17.8 
2010 0.118 149 23.6 24.2 40.6 17.7 
2012 0.104 213 22.7 24.2 35.4 14.6 
Belgium       
2004 0.073 130 25.8 22.9 36.0 15.5 
2006 0.087 137 25.5 27.5 34.0 17.9 
2010 0.094 275 25.5 25.6 35.3 16.5 
2012 0.110 313 23.9 22.3 29.8 13.5 
France       
2004 0.038 62 21.5 18.0 32.4 12.9 
2006 0.016 18 31.5 37.5 40.5 16.5 
2010 0.029 95 24.9 22.9 36.9 14.4 
2012 0.030 61 30.6 25.6 35.7 18.4 
Switzerland       
2004 0.081 41 19.1 18.3 29.7 13.5 
2006 0.067 52 17.3 19.4 29.1 12.0 
2010 0.059 102 17.9 17.9 32.7 11.9 
2012 0.050 67 13.4 12.9 29.7 9.3 
Austria       
2004 0.048 36 22.2 22.4 37.8 14.8 
2006 0.078 37 25.9 28.9 37.1 18.2 
2010 0.090 207 26.0 24.3 34.2 16.1 
2012 0.071 115 28.9 26.4 32.7 18.5 
Spain       
2004 0.078 88 25.5 25.2 32.9 14.5 
2006 0.086 74 26.5 24.9 35.8 18.4 
2010 0.081 116 24.4 26.7 28.5 14.7 
2012 0.067 178 22.3 21.2 39.8 13.4 
Italy       
2004 0.057 78 24.4 21.3 34.1 16.2 
2006 0.057 69 18.1 20.9 38.5 13.3 
2010 0.042 70 20.6 15.1 31.2 12.3 
2012 0.030 73 16.6 14.2 28.7 10.1 
US       
2004 0.083 727 14.9 13.0 27.3 10.0 
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2006 0.094 628 16.3 14.3 29.3 10.8 
2010 0.099 1176 14.0 12.7 27.6 9.4 
2012 0.111 1154 15.2 14.2 29.2 10.6 
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Table A.3: Percentage of Those in the Bottom Decile of Each Health Index Receiving 
Disability or Any Pension 
 PVW ML MHD 
 DI Any Pension DI Any Pension DI Any Pension 
Sweden       
2004 0.579 0.843 0.595 0.856 0.323 0.577 
2006 0.594 0.773 0.623 0.813 0.422 0.742 
2010 0.614 0.852 0.669 0.877 0.386 0.590 
2012 0.715 0.774 0.698 0.737 0.518 0.557 
Denmark       
2004 0.617 0.792 0.660 0.814 0.407 0.538 
2006 0.473 0.752 0.513 0.759 0.347 0.553 
2010 0.547 0.749 0.567 0.746 0.338 0.471 
2012 0.447 0.702 0.469 0.687 0.278 0.478 
Germany       
2004 0.219 0.522 0.231 0.540 0.139 0.431 
2006 0.167 0.628 0.182 0.589 0.150 0.459 
2010 0.168 0.310 0.194 0.311 0.137 0.259 
2012 0.303 0.582 0.338 0.602 0.245 0.469 
Netherlands       
2004 0.524 0.654 0.566 0.665 0.428 0.520 
2006 0.473 0.680 0.426 0.665 0.286 0.479 
2010 0.356 0.561 0.372 0.580 0.214 0.435 
2012 0.423 0.577 0.456 0.595 0.217 0.443 
Belgium       
2004 0.303 0.668 0.294 0.638 0.148 0.506 
2006 0.339 0.671 0.316 0.702 0.218 0.612 
2010 0.298 0.627 0.335 0.666 0.228 0.529 
2012 0.434 0.693 0.489 0.730 0.337 0.609 
France       
2004 0.189 0.533 0.209 0.516 0.094 0.361 
2006 0.052 0.377 0.056 0.406 0.020 0.249 
2010 0.127 0.542 0.137 0.541 0.048 0.426 
2012 0.114 0.550 0.116 0.555 0.068 0.498 
Switzerland       
2004 0.400 0.606 0.407 0.619 0.217 0.428 
2006 0.357 0.507 0.368 0.481 0.274 0.416 
2010 0.334 0.484 0.322 0.474 0.176 0.348 
2012 0.291 0.439 0.322 0.474 0.136 0.261 
Austria       
2004 0.178 0.714 0.162 0.662 0.079 0.546 
2006 0.265 0.743 0.259 0.664 0.243 0.732 
2010 0.301 0.700 0.315 0.740 0.219 0.575 
2012 0.261 0.615 0.274 0.630 0.135 0.514 
Spain       
2004 0.273 0.513 0.236 0.535 0.214 0.440 
2006 0.360 0.491 0.329 0.530 0.224 0.452 
2010 0.256 0.473 0.272 0.497 0.289 0.519 
2012 0.284 0.475 0.270 0.506 0.140 0.437 
Italy       
2004 0.195 0.490 0.254 0.564 0.181 0.407 
2006 0.260 0.590 0.298 0.616 0.129 0.424 
2010 0.197 0.463 0.235 0.448 0.136 0.415 
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2012 0.167 0.366 0.182 0.406 0.119 0.270 
US       
2004 0.440 0.680 0.452 0.683 0.257 0.499 
2006 0.472 0.737 0.490 0.742 0.258 0.544 
2010 0.560 0.763 0.555 0.781 0.281 0.558 
2012 0.542 0.697 0.543 0.716 0.305 0.535 
 
 
Sources for Tables A.2 and A.3: Authors' calculations using SHARE wave 1, 2, 4, and 5; and HRS waves 7, 8, 10, and 11. 
) Based on sample of respondents aged  50 through 64 in each wave.  
 
 
